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Abstract 
Background: REDD+ is being questioned by the particular status of High Forest/Low Deforestation countries. 
Indeed, the formulation of reference levels is made difficult by the confrontation of low historical deforestation 
records with the forest transition theory on the one hand. On the other hand, those countries might formulate incred‑
ibly high deforestation scenarios to ensure large payments even in case of inaction.
Results: Using a wide range of scenarios within the Guiana Shield, from methods involving basic assumptions made 
from past deforestation, to explicit modelling of deforestation using relevant socio‑economic variables at the regional 
scale, we show that the most common methodologies predict huge increases in deforestation, unlikely to happen 
given the existing socio‑economic situation. More importantly, it is unlikely that funds provided under most of these 
scenarios could compensate for the total cost of avoided deforestation in the region, including social and economic 
costs.
Conclusion: This study suggests that a useful and efficient international mechanism should really focus on removing 
the underlying political and socio‑economic forces of deforestation rather than on hypothetical result‑based pay‑
ments estimated from very questionable reference levels.
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Background
Land-use change is a major driver of carbon emissions in 
tropical regions, whose contribution has been estimated 
at 9% of the global carbon budget over the last decade, 
with tropical deforestation being alone the largest con-
tributor to these carbon fluxes [1]. Facing the threat of 
global warming, reducing carbon emissions from tropical 
forested areas appears as a necessary option in the first 
place on the political agenda [2]. Within international 
mechanisms such as REDD+ , avoided deforestation has 
emerged as a presumably low-cost option for meeting 
decrease in carbon emissions requirements [3, 4], mostly 
because a lot of deforestation was occurring within mar-
ginally profitable areas such as shifting cultivation areas 
[2].
Additionality, i.e. the fact that a decrease in deforesta-
tion would not have occurred without efforts made by the 
country/institution involved, is one of the corner-stones 
of REDD+ [5] by ensuring that policy changes brought 
a net decrease in expected deforestation. Formulating 
a baseline against which carbon credits are evaluated is 
the most critical component of the REDD+ mechanism 
[6]. Indeed, in theory, credited emissions must be closely 
linked with actual emissions reductions. On the contrary, 
the misformulation of baselines can affect additionality 
and thus the efficiency of the mechanism [7]. However, 
reference scenarios are often built upon counterfactual 
hypotheses which are by nature uncertain [8].
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A statement of the large range of carbon credits attrib-
uted in function of the baseline rule chosen was already 
provided by Griscom et  al. [7], showing differences of 
two orders of magnitude in credited emissions for a same 
amount of effective emissions reduction, thus confirm-
ing the risk of inefficiency of REDD+ mechanism. Fac-
ing those uncertainties, Griscom et  al. [7] defended the 
use of a strictly historical reference scenario which was 
an accurate predictor of deforestation in the dataset used 
based on FAO data. This historical baseline has been 
the most frequently chosen reference scenario, for its 
simplicity and transparency [9]. However, historical sce-
narios have faced a fundamental shortcoming under the 
perspective of forest transition, i.e. the idea that coun-
tries having experienced high rates of deforestation will 
decrease their deforestation rates while developing [10], 
making thus past deforestation a poor predictor of future 
deforestation (Fig. 1). By nature, under the assumptions 
of the forest transition theory, historical baseline does 
not provide incentives for High Forest Low Deforesta-
tion (HFLD) countries, which would necessarily increase 
their level of deforestation in the future. On the contrary, 
it is much more interesting for countries having experi-
enced high past deforestation rates, by allowing them to 
establish high future reference levels. Although the forest 
transition theory has been criticized for its lack of gener-
alizability [11], its conceptual framework is often tangible 
in debates related to REDD+ baselines definition [12].
HFLD countries contain a significant carbon stock, 
corresponding to 10.5% of tropical forest carbon [7]. 
They represent the largest remaining tracts of intact 
and unfragmented tropical forests [13]. These countries 
are a challenging object for the credibility and equity of 
REDD+ mechanism. Indeed, they might contribute to a 
significant increase in future deforestation if the forest 
transition theory is true. Furthermore, reference scenar-
ios influenced by vested interests might exaggerate the 
baselines considered. However, besides this importance, 
they have attracted low interest of researchers within the 
scope of REDD+ . It is thus important to fill the scien-
tific gap concerning these countries, especially since the 
publication of new deforestation maps at high temporal 
and spatial resolutions by Hansen et al. [14] now allows 
to better estimate and map the small scale deforesta-
tion observed in these areas. Based on this new dataset, 
a recent study focusing on the Guiana Shield (which is 
a highly forested area suffering low historical deforesta-
tion) showed that, contrary to the statement of Griscom 
et  al. [7], deforestation was not decreasing but rapidly 
increasing under the pressure of gold-mining [15]. More-
over, such increase was shown to be very heterogene-
ous at the national scale, following the heterogeneity in 
the local political response to illegal gold-mining: talking 
of HFLD countries is convenient at the global scale but 
should not hide the diversity of local contexts.
The Guiana Shield, along with Belize, Gabon and 
Peru, is part of what it commonly considered as HFLD 
countries [7]. Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana and 
the Brazilian State of Amapá cover an extent of close to 
600,000  sq. km of tropical rainforests and are the terri-
tories with highest forested area per capita in the world 
[16]. Moreover, they are a symbol of the fairness con-
cern related with REDD+ : HFLD countries didn’t ben-
efit from the potential economic prosperity which would 
have been brought by deforestation, and would need 
financial compensation to develop [17]. In order to allow 
HFLD countries to benefit from REDD+ , alternative 
scenarios to the historical baseline were proposed. An 
extreme example is the ‘Economically Rationale Baseline’ 
proposed by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company 
and published with Guyana as a case study [17], con-
sisting of a sort of massive adjustment factor compared 
to the strictly historical scenario. Such a baseline, built 
upon McKinsey’s carbon mitigation cost-curve present-
ing reductions of emissions derived from slash-and-burn 
agriculture as a low-cost mitigation option, assumes the 
deforestation of all available forest areas outside pro-
tected and Amerindian areas. This legitimates the fear 
of ‘hot-air’ and might be considered as environmental 
blackmailing [18] representing a threat to the functioning 
of REDD+ [19].
Fig. 1 Comparison between two hypothetical REDD+ projects, 
using a strictly historical reference scenario, in light of the forest 
transition theory, after Angelsen [54]. The forest transition pathway is 
displayed in red, with high initial forest cover decreasing ever more 
rapidly, before stabilizing when forested areas become scarce. Under 
the Medium Forest/High Deforestation (MFHD) or Low Forest/High 
Deforestation (LFHD) scenario, where the country would reach the 
end of the forest transition, the historical baseline (blue dashed line) 
largely overestimates deforestation, artificially provoking a large 
amount of credited carbon. On the contrary, under the High Forest/
Low Deforestation (HFLD) scenario, the historical baseline (green 
dashed line) largely underestimates deforestation, inducing a debt 
in carbon credits. *Timeline is hypothetical and only reflects the 
duration of the forest transition within each country
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Besides their common status of HFLD countries, these 
entities greatly differ in terms of legal status and structure 
of their economy that makes of them a study area of par-
ticular interest for the analysis of REDD+ . While Guyana 
and Suriname are independent countries, French Guiana 
and Amapá are part of a larger nation which might cause 
discrepancies between local and national political and 
administrative contexts. They also differ in terms of the 
structure of their economy, which is directly related to 
the local drivers of deforestation. In Guyana, gold-mining 
is considered by far as the main driver of deforestation, 
causing 90% of total deforestation following official fig-
ures [20], and is a major contributor to the national Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), with a share of 15.5% in 2011 
[21]. In Suriname, this situation is very similar: in 2010 
around 10% of the national GDP was attributed to gold-
mining, a value which could have increased a lot given 
the subsequent explosion of gold-prices in 2011 and 2012 
[22]. It is also estimated that gold-mining monopolizes 
more than a third of the total work force in the country 
[23]. In French Guiana, the dependence upon natural 
resources is lower, as local consumption remains largely 
dependent upon imports from Metropolitan France [24]. 
Services, including transportation, provide three-fourths 
of the added value to the economy [25]. In Amapá also, 
the service sector contributes to 80% of the GDP of 
the State [26]. In both of these entities, repressive poli-
cies against illegal gold-mining [27, 28] might have con-
tributed to its lower impact on the economies and on 
deforestation [15]. Regarding REDD+ implementation, 
countries’ situations are diverse besides their biophysical 
similarities. As previously mentioned, Guyana has been 
pioneer with the signing of the agreement with Norway. 
Suriname is now officially in an ‘implementation step’ but 
information about its national strategy is hardly avail-
able. Both in Amapá and French Guiana, local authorities 
want to propose local REDD+ projects, but they depend 
on the national environmental policy of Brazil and of 
France (which itself is not eligible for REDD+ funding by 
being an Annex I country).
The objective of the present study, the first one to 
exclusively focus on HFLD countries, was thus to assess 
the heterogeneity of predicted future deforestation in the 
Guiana Shield using different possible methodologies of 
reference scenarios formulation. The range of scenarios 
considered encompasses the different normative scenar-
ios (i.e. describing a pre-specified future, such as defined 
by the IPCC [29]) used by Griscom et al. [7], where future 
deforestation is estimated based on past deforestation 
trends or basic assumptions, but also includes propos-
als made within the Guyana/Norway agreement. More-
over, as it is crucial that deforestation models explicitly 
focus on the socio-economic and political drivers of 
deforestation [30], we also included future deforesta-
tion scenarios where deforestation is estimated based on 
assumptions concerning local deforestation drivers.
The great heterogeneity of the normative scenarios 
indicates that any baseline could be chosen and creates 
a serious risk of hot air (false emissions reductions). 
Although an ‘Economically rationale baseline’ such as 
defined by McKinsey [17] is an extreme case, more bal-
anced scenarios still predict major increases in deforesta-
tion. This could promote deforestation leakages to HFLD 
countries by attracting agricultural activities previously 
occurring within high deforestation countries, while still 
receiving money from carbon credits. Identifying present 
drivers of deforestation might create more conservative 
scenarios; however the contribution of gold prices, which 
are by nature highly volatile, makes the formulation of 
a credible scenario a difficult issue. In summary, pre-
dicted emissions baselines hide the main important issue 
which is how to support a more sustainable endogenous 
development for those countries. Relying on implau-
sible baselines undermines the credibility of efforts to 
decrease deforestation while enhancing socio-economic 
development, which is necessary to eradicate poverty 
and in parallel to provide a long term protection to the 
environment.
Methods
Deforestation dataset
Data on deforestation in this area are based on yearly 
deforestation maps during 2001–2014 provided by 
Hansen et al. [14]. As such, we exclusively focus on defor-
estation and do not consider forest degradation, although 
the detection of deforested pixels might be produced by 
a continuous degradation process. These maps were re-
projected to EPSG:3857 and re-sampled at a pixel resolu-
tion of 30 meters. A crown cover threshold of 75% was 
applied to the forest cover map of year 2000, using a strict 
forest definition consistent with the density of the rain-
forest of the Guiana Shield. We observed that below 80%, 
total forested area measured is not significantly changed 
compared to lower crown cover thresholds often used 
(results not shown). A majority filter was then applied to 
remove isolated deforested pixels most likely caused by 
misclassification of satellite images [31] or isolated blow-
downs [32]. Large scale deforestation occurring within 
coastal swampy areas and mangroves was also removed, 
as we assumed that land use change observed in these 
areas was natural and not anthropogenic.
Scenarization
Based on observed deforestation in the region over 
2001–2014, we formulated different scenarios of future 
deforestation until 2050, described in Table 1 and more 
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detailed in Additional file  1. We distinguished between 
normative and socio-economic scenarios. Normative 
scenarios are defined a priori, based on certain assump-
tions applied to past deforestation rates. These normative 
scenarios were built following different crediting base-
lines proposals. As such, these proposals initially don’t 
aim at predicting deforestation itself, but at being con-
fronted with observed deforestation during the course 
of a REDD+ project to estimate carbon credits paid to a 
country. In the present study, we estimated the amount 
of deforestation envisioned within each of these nor-
mative scenarios to show the range of possible defor-
estation trends they consider, with no objective of being 
realistic or for predictive purposes. On the contrary to 
the normative scenarios, future deforestation under the 
different socio-economic scenarios is modeled based 
on the relationship between relevant socio-economic 
variables (population increase and gold price [30]) and 
deforestation.
All models calibrated are log normal, as we assumed 
a multiplicative error term with increasing predicted 
deforestation. For all normative models, we estimated 
cumulative deforestation (CDef) by country at time t 
over the period of interest (2015–2050). Historical Aver-
age (HA) was the first normative model we calibrated on 
historical data, assuming unchanged deforestation rate in 
time. This model allowed us to estimate the parameter σ, 
corresponding to the model’s error term, which was then 
injected in all following normative models to take into 
account the uncertainty associated with predicted defor-
estation. Concerning the socio-economic models, yearly 
future deforestation was estimated by the addition of two 
components  (DefGM and  DefDem).  DefGM estimates defor-
estation due to gold-mining in country c at time t in func-
tion of future estimated gold prices (with high and low 
hypotheses), which is known to be a very good predictor 
of deforestation due to gold-mining [15].  DefDem esti-
mates deforestation not due to gold-mining, assuming 
that remaining deforestation is a function of the demo-
graphic increase.
Future deforestation maps
Future deforestation maps were computed by coupling 
a deforestation location model, predicting where defor-
estation is more likely to occur, and an intensity model 
predicting the amount of deforestation. The deforesta-
tion location model provided a spatial deforestation risk 
map based on Random Forest algorithm [35], known 
for its good predictive accuracy and robustness to noise 
[36], and ability to take into account complex and non-
linear relationship between deforestation and associ-
ated explanatory variables [37]. Explanatory variables 
included in this model were all geographical variables 
listed in Table  2. Greenstone areas are more favora-
ble to the presence of gold, we thus expect a decreasing 
probability of deforestation due to gold-mining further 
from Greenstones. Alluvial gold-mining is the domi-
nant exploitation method in the region: deforestation 
due to gold-mining is likely to concentrate along small 
streams of low Strahler order. The predicted intensity of 
deforestation, i.e. the number of pixels to sample from 
the deforestation risk map to obtain the final predicted 
deforestation map, was derived from the different above-
mentioned deforestation scenarios. Maps were finally 
computed for those nine different scenarios. For more 
details on the methodology applied here to create future 
deforestation maps, please refer to Dezécache et al. [30].
From deforestation scenarios to carbon crediting
In order to estimate the amount of carbon credits which 
could be paid to a country following different reference 
scenarios assumed, we estimated the difference between 
mean predicted deforestation over 2015–2050 from each 
scenario and the historical scenario. We assumed that 
the pathway effectively followed by each country corre-
sponded to the historical baseline, as we were interested 
Table 2 List of geographical explanatory variables included in the deforestation location models
* Shapefiles of protected areas and road network were provided respectively by Forest offices in Guyana (GFC), Suriname (SBB), French Guiana (ONF) and Amapa (IEF). 
** The shapefiles for Greenstone areas were manually digitized following the geological map produced by the Guyana Geology and Mines Commission (http://www.
ggmc.gov.gy/Docum ents/PDF/GeoSe rvice s/guy_geol.pdf ) in Guyana; obtained from the Surinamese forest office (SBB) in Suriname; obtained from French Geological 
Survey (BRGM) in French Guiana; and provided by the Scientific and Technological Research Institute (IEPA) in Amapá
Variable name Resolution (m) Approx. range Sources
Protected areas 30 Binary *See legend
Distance to nearest road 150 0–170 km **See legend
Distance to nearest Greenstone area 150 0–65 km **See legend
Distance to nearest stream following Strahler classication: [38–40]
Order 1–3 (small) 150 0–2 km
Order 4–6 (intermediate) 150 0–15 km
Order 7+ (large) 105 0–120 km
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in the amount of credited carbon in the case where coun-
tries manage to stabilize their deforestation rates to low 
historical values.
Estimated avoided deforestation over 2015–2050 
allowed us to calculate avoided carbon emissions by 
using a carbon density of aboveground biomass of 132.5 
tC/ha, based on an average 265 t/ha of dry aboveground 
biomass over the area and a 50% coefficient to convert 
this dry biomass to carbon content, as reported in Molto 
[41]. A coefficient of 44/121 was applied to convert these 
tons of carbon into tons of  CO2. Two carbon prices were 
used: a low price of 5 USD/t close to current carbon price 
within the EU Emissions Trade System and a high price 
of 30 USD/t proposed by France as a carbon price floor 
in Europe.2 Potential incomes due to the sale of carbon 
credits obtained from avoided deforestation, including 
their uncertainty for the different scenarios and possi-
ble carbon prices, were finally expressed in  % of average 
national yearly GDP over 2001–2014.
Results
Variability of predicted deforestation intensity under each 
baseline
Predicted deforestation is extremely variable following 
the scenario applied, with a range of two orders of mag-
nitude between the lowest normative scenarios and the 
Economically rationale baseline (ERB, see definition in 
Table  1) whether at national (Fig.  2) or regional scales 
(Fig. 3). Even excluding the extreme case of the ERB, we 
still observe a difference of more than one order of mag-
nitude between lowest and highest future deforestation 
scenarios. Both socio-economic scenarios are among the 
low deforestation scenarios, but their predictions greatly 
differ between the low and high gold price hypotheses 
in Guyana and Suriname where deforestation is largely 
determined by gold-mining activity.
Future deforestation maps
Directly related with those huge differences in terms 
of predicted deforestation, future deforestation maps 
(maps for all scenarios are displayed in SM3) are very 
variable, especially comparing historical or high gold 
price scenarios (Fig. 4a, b) with the extremely high ERB 
scenario (Fig.  4c) where, by definition, only integrally 
protected areas and Amerindian areas remain forested. 
Besides changes in predicted deforestation intensity, a 
visual comparison of historical (Fig.  4a) and high gold 
price (Fig. 4b) baselines also indicates major shifts in the 
location of deforestation hotspots. Indeed, compared to 
the historical scenario, large amounts of deforestation 
appear in Suriname and Guyana in areas correspond-
ing to Greenstone areas where gold-mining activities are 
concentrated.
Such shift in deforestation location is also supported by 
the ranking by index of importance of variables included 
within the different Random Forest models (Fig.  5). In 
the deforestation location component of the histori-
cal scenario, the most important variable is distance to 
nearest road. Under the high gold price scenario, two 
deforestation location models were calibrated, one for 
deforestation due to gold-mining and another one for 
deforestation not due to gold-mining. Variables ranking 
within the model for not gold-mining areas is similar to 
the ranking of the historical model. However, in gold-
mining areas, distance to Greenstone appears as the most 
important variable, which greatly shapes the deforesta-
tion map as, with extremely high gold prices, gold-mining 
largely increases its contribution to deforestation in Guy-
ana and Suriname compared to the historical scenario.
The contribution of credited carbon to national GDP
The very diverse contribution of each hypothetical 
REDD+ scenario to each country’s GDP reflects the vari-
ability of predicted deforestation (Fig.  6). The assumed 
range of carbon prices (5 to 30 USD/tCO2e) also strongly 
Fig. 2 Cumulated predicted deforestation over 2015–2050 per 
country (‘ap’, ‘guf’, ‘guy’ and ‘sur’ stand for Amapá, French Guiana, 
Guyana and Suriname respectively) and per scenario (log y‑scale). 
Dots are mean predicted deforestation and are associated with a 
95% confidence interval. ‘HA’ stands for ‘Historical average’. ‘GM_low’ 
and ‘GM_high’ stand for the gold‑mining models with a low or high 
assumed future gold price. ‘ERB’ stands for ‘Economically Rational 
Baseline’. ‘CI’ stands for Combined Incentives models (with three 
sub‑models FPS, NPS and BAU described in Table 1). ‘JRC’ stands for 
‘Joint Research Center’ with two associated sub‑models for 2050 and 
2100
1 https ://www.epa.gov/energ y/green house -gases -equiv alenc ies-calcu lator 
-calcu latio ns-and-refer ences .
2 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/envir onmen t/2016/may/17/franc e-sets-
carbo n-price -floor .
Page 7 of 12Dezécache et al. Carbon Balance Manage           (2018) 13:21 
affect this estimated percentage. A comparison with the 
contribution of gold-mining to national GDP indicates 
that only extremely high reference scenarios such as ERB, 
JRC2050 and 2100, and BAU-CI might compensate the 
contribution of gold-mining, especially for more recent 
years where incomes provided by gold-mining increased 
a lot with the explosion of gold prices.
Discussion
The credibility of future deforestation scenarios
The footprint of the forest transition theory in REDD+ debate 
on the formulation of deforestation reference levels
Angelsen and Rudel [12] suggest that there should be no 
‘one-size-fits all portfolio of REDD+ policies’ and that 
the forest transition theory is a useful tool for adapting 
REDD+ to the differing national contexts. As such, while 
in countries at an early stage in the forest transition (like 
HFLD countries, assuming that their high forest covers 
prove that they haven’t passed the forest transition yet) 
REDD+ should focus on preserving carbon stored within 
old-growth forest, in countries experiencing high rates of 
current deforestation, such as Indonesia, the emergency 
would be to slow down deforestation rates. Finally, in 
countries with low remaining forests, incentives for for-
est regrowth would be the priority in terms of national 
carbon balance. Although such flexibility would enhance 
countries participation, which is necessary for REDD+ to 
be effective, it could seriously reduce its efficiency if the 
forest transition theory is not (or not anymore) a per-
tinent concept, by authorizing very high baselines for 
countries identified as HFLD.
Angelsen and Rudel [12] mention different socio-
economic and political determinant of forest transition, 
but in our opinion the debate remains too closely asso-
ciated to the questions of forest cover and deforestation 
only, such as suggested by the mentions to HFLD, HFHD, 
LFHD and LFLD countries which might be perceived as 
successive necessary steps in the environmental History 
of a country. Such a denomination should not be used 
as a too simplistic trademark unable to appropriately 
characterize the underlying socio-economic and politi-
cal processes occurring within the different countries. As 
previously mentioned, the service sector contributes to 
more than 3/4 of the GDP of Amapá and French Guiana. 
Additionally, the urbanization rate has been increasing a 
lot in Suriname, from 49% in 1975 to 74% in 2005 [42]. 
Similarly in French Guiana, the two cities of Cayenne 
and Kourou account for 73% of the population [42]. Such 
a concentration in main cities is also obvious in Amapá, 
where 75% of the population are concentrated in the cap-
ital district of Macapa, making Amapá the most urban 
State of Brazil [43]. Only in Guyana the rural popula-
tion represents a very significant share of the population, 
with only 27% of the population being urban in 2005 [44]. 
Such a low percentage of rural inhabitants in the region, 
itself inhabited by a very low population, questions the 
credibility of the development of large scale agriculture in 
the absence of available work force, although recruitment 
of foreign labor cannot be discarded.
Confronting inflated baselines to local evidences 
from deforestation data in the Guiana Shield
Besides the general socio-economic background in the 
region, our socio-economic scenarios suggest that cur-
rent drivers of deforestation in the countries involved, 
mostly gold-mining, urban and agricultural expansion, 
are unlikely to provoke huge increase in deforestation 
such as observed in the extremely high normative sce-
narios, even in a context of very high gold prices. Such a 
statement is of course questionable in the framework of 
the forest transition theory, because in these socio-eco-
nomic modelling frameworks we didn’t assume the pos-
sibility of great shifts in development trends.
Export agriculture is likely to be the only driver which 
could cause such high deforestation as predicted from 
high normative scenarios, in particular oil palm planta-
tions which are included as a major component of poten-
tial deforestation in the report by McKinsey [17] over 
Guyana.
Fig. 3 Cumulative predicted deforestation at the regional scale 
(2015–2050) following each reference scenario (log y and x scales). 
Red dots indicate observed yearly deforestation over 2001–2014. 
Mean predicted future deforestation is displayed with an envelope 
corresponding to the 95% confidence interval of each model. ‘HA’ 
stands for ‘Historical average’. ‘GM_low’ and ‘GM_high’ stand for 
the gold‑mining models with a low or high assumed future gold 
price. ‘ERB’ stands for ‘Economically Rational Baseline’. ‘CI’ stands for 
Combined Incentives models (with three sub‑models FPS, NPS and 
BAU described in Table 1). ‘JRC’ stands for ‘Joint Research Center’ with 
two associated sub‑models for 2050 and 2100
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Oil palm plantations exist in Guyana and Suriname 
but at a very small scale. In Suriname, more than 5000 ha 
of oil palm plantations were reported in 1990, a fig-
ure which dropped to 20 ha in 2000, due to the political 
instability and a bud rot disease present in Central and 
South America [45]. Some argued that oil palm might 
rise again in Suriname, after an agreement was signed in 
2004 with a Chinese company for exploiting 40,000 ha.3 
Although the project was delayed for more than 10 years, 
the government of Suriname declared that a new agree-
ment would be signed soon [46]. However, given the 
extremely low soil fertility [16, 47], and low level of 
infrastructures in the Guiana Shield, it is questionable 
whether such a large scale expansion of oil palm in the 
region is a credible scenario, in particular within a con-
text of development of zero deforestation objective in 
the oil palm industry.4 Developing countries might fail 
to implement the necessary programs to effectively limit 
their deforestation rates [18], but inversely it is question-
able whether they can effectively provoke such increase 
in deforestation as predicted based on the high norma-
tive scenarios, because such increase would not only be 
a question of political will but would also depend on the 
existence of potential economic investors.
The harmful consequences of disproportionate 
deforestation scenarios
Corrupting REDD+ additionality principle
The extreme variability of deforestation baselines under 
different procedures of reference scenarios formulation, 
such a previously noted by Griscom et al. [7] makes the 
choice of a baseline non trivial compared to simple his-
torical average, which provides strong incentives for 
major deforesting countries only. Given the range of 
possible baselines, it is impossible to clearly state which 
would be the most appropriate scenario in the absence of 
any consensual choice criteria. This is even more critical 
in the case of HFLD countries, which are not in a good 
situation for bargaining compared to major deforesting 
countries. Indeed, while they need to demonstrate that 
their future rates of deforestation will increase compared 
to historical rates, in order to benefit from higher finan-
cial transfers from eventual REDD+ projects, a risk of 
baseline inflation emerges [8].
Such risk of baseline inflation greatly threatens the 
additionality principle which is one of the major pillars 
of REDD+ mechanism. This principle is also questioned 
by the natural uncertainty of the modelled deforestation 
process, such as evidenced by the comparison of our 
socio-economic scenarios. While deforestation remains 
almost unchanged in Amapá and French Guiana in the 
low and high gold prices scenarios, as both countries 
have been fighting against illegal gold-mining [27], a 
major increase in deforestation is predicted in Suriname 
and Guyana in the case of high gold price (multiplica-
tion by a 2.9 factor compared to the low price scenario). 
While there could be a tendency to assume that low 
Fig. 4 Maps of future predicted deforestation under historical 
scenario (a), high gold price scenario (b) and ‘Economically Rational 
Baseline’ (c) in Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana and Amapá (left to 
right). Red pixels correspond to areas of high deforestation (> 30% 
of 2014 forest cover deforested over 2015–2050). Border conflicts 
between Guyana and Suriname, and Suriname and French Guiana 
cause an overlap in the southern parts of these countries
3 http://www.carib beann ewsno w.com/headl ine-Surin ame-palm-oil-indus 
try-may-rise-again -after -setba cks-32970 .html.
4 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/susta inabl e-busin ess/2015/jan/26/palm-
oil-compa nies-deliv er-defor estat ion-promi ses.
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deforestation within countries of the Guiana Shield per-
sists due to a strong political will (this is perceptible in 
press articles indicating that Guyana ‘kept’ deforestation 
low [48]), it is critical to pay attention to biases caused by 
changing commodities prices which can alter the percep-
tion of local political efforts, as for example if deforesta-
tion remains at low values not due to the implementation 
of stronger policies but because of low gold prices.
Finally, if a development of agribusiness cannot be 
excluded a priori in the Guiana Shield, including this 
option within incredibly high reference levels might cre-
ate a risk of global deforestation leakages, which would 
also affect REDD+ additionality at the global scale. 
Deforestation due to oil palm plantations could leak from 
present high deforestation countries to HFLD countries 
which could continue to receive large amount of carbon 
credits while increasing a lot their deforestation rates. 
This possibility would seriously undermine the efficiency 
of REDD+ mechanism.
Will REDD+ funds be enough to effectively limit 
deforestation?
The success of emissions-based approaches such as 
REDD+ is based on the hypothesis that reducing defor-
estation and forest degradation is possible at low cost 
[3, 4, 17]. However, opportunity costs are really under-
estimated, because they cannot include non-markets 
activities such as subsistence shifting cultivation. More 
importantly, they neglect implementation, transaction 
and institutional costs which might represent the hidden 
part of the iceberg [19]. As an example, a case study from 
Brazil estimated that direct payments to families and 
support to communities accounted for 55% of the total 
cost of the project, the remaining being associated with 
administrative or enforcement costs [19].
This point will be critical in the case of the Guiana 
Shield, where a large share of deforestation derives from 
artisanal small-scale gold-mining [49]. This activity might 
be tolerated de facto in most cases but could instanta-
neously convert to an officially illegal activity in case of 
higher level of law enforcement. In case of illegal activi-
ties, Gregersen et  al. [50] suggest that the opportunity 
cost is inappropriate, and that the cost of a deforestation 
reduction project is simply the cost of law enforcement. 
French Guiana has been involved in a repressive policy 
against illegal gold-mining for more than 10  years [27], 
aiming at decreasing the environmental impacts of such 
activity. The costs of such policy are confidential but are 
likely to be huge as it includes satellite and helicopter 
observation of mining sites over a very large area covering 
thousands of sq. km, terrestrial interventions to destroy 
illegal mining sites and in some case the deportation 
of illegal Brazilian gold-miners who represents a great 
Fig. 5 Ranking following Mean Decrease in Gini index (MDG) of 
spatial variables included within the three deforestation location 
models. NGMM, GMM, HA stand for no gold‑mining model, 
gold‑mining model and historical scenario respectively. Mean 
Decrease in Gini index (MDG) is used to rank variables by importance. 
When random forest algorithm is used to classify a sample of pixels 
within two groups (deforested, not deforested), a very important 
variable will increase a lot the “purity” within each group and will 
be associated with a large MDG. On the contrary, a variable of low 
importance will not contribute to increasing intra‑group purity and 
will have a lower MDG
Fig. 6 Quantity of allowable cumulated carbon credits up to 2050, 
following each alternative deforestation baseline, and expressed 
as the share of mean yearly national GDP over 2001–2014 (log 
scale). For each scenario, the range indicates the share of GDP for 
carbon prices ranging between 5 and 30 USD/tCO2e. ‘AP’, ‘GUF’, ‘GUY’ 
and ‘SUR’ stand for Amapá, French Guiana, Guyana and Suriname 
respectively. We assume no debt in case of scenario followed lower 
than historical average, which explains values 0 attributed to GM‑low 
and GM‑high scenarios in Amapá. As a comparison, the contribution 
of gold‑mining to national GDP [21, 23, 26] was added to this figure 
in the form of black dotted segments, with corresponding year 
indicated above each segment. This data was uncertain for French 
Guiana as taken from an interview (https ://repor terre .net/La‑foret 
‑guyan aise‑menac ee‑par‑les‑mines ‑d‑or) and not available in 
official databases, and was denoted with an asterisk. ‘HA’ stands for 
‘Historical average’. ‘GM_low’ and ‘GM_high’ stand for the gold‑mining 
models with a low or high assumed future gold price. ‘ERB’ stands for 
‘Economically Rational Baseline’. ‘CI’ stands for Combined Incentives 
models (with three sub‑models FPS, NPS and BAU described in 
Table 1). ‘JRC’ stands for ‘Joint Research Center’ with two associated 
sub‑models for 2050 and 2100
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majority of the gold-mining labor force in the region 
[51]. This point is likely to be underestimated when blind 
historical models are computed in the form of future 
deforestation maps without characterizing the underly-
ing socio-economic drivers of deforestation [30]. In our 
study area, these models represented by our historical 
average model, are mostly influenced by the tendency 
of roads to focalize deforestation hotspots in accessible 
areas, forgetting the existence of gold-mining in very 
remote areas difficult to monitor and control. Moreover, 
beside monitoring and repression costs, ensuring a per-
manence of avoided deforestation would eventually also 
require costs associated with finding alternative jobs for 
people previously involved in illegal activities [52].
Finally, beyond the problem of estimating the total 
costs of avoided deforestation, which is likely to be large, 
it is necessary to question the ability and the willingness 
of donors to compensate for avoided deforestation esti-
mated based on a chosen reference scenario. As previ-
ously mentioned, the example of the Government of 
Norway, which only paid a fraction of the opportunity 
cost of not deforesting Guyana estimated by McKinsey 
& Company, might reveal that funds available are lim-
ited. While McKinsey’s report estimated that an annu-
ity comprised between 430 million and 2.3 billion USD 
might be enough to compensate for the opportunity costs 
of not deforesting Guyana [17], Norway finally agreed to 
provide only up to 50 million USD per year on average, 
over a project of 5 years. If several donors must contrib-
ute together to reach the required funding level, the con-
vergence of their requirements might also be difficult to 
obtain.
Conclusions
Focusing on the underlying processes leading to defor-
estation, rather than simply predicting deforestation pat-
terns based on historical models, might contribute to a 
better understanding of what would be needed to make 
REDD+ effective [53]. As previously mentioned, oppor-
tunity costs might greatly underestimate real costs of 
avoided deforestation, and we can wonder whether funds 
provided from REDD+ carbon credits will be enough to 
develop such policies, unless extremely high reference 
scenarios are formulated in order to attract huge amounts 
of financial incentives. Even though substantial financial 
transfer are made however, we may wonder if countries 
can succeed in implementing the necessary policies to 
decrease their rates of deforestation, especially in case of 
poor or ‘failed States’ [18]. Indeed, moving from a sim-
ple conceptual framework, where land-users were paid 
to limit the impact of their activities on neighboring for-
est, to a much more complex situations were perverse 
incentives and corruption are perceived as leading forces 
of deforestation [5, 18] points out the importance of the 
political dimension of deforestation.
Although it is tempting for HFLD countries to elabo-
rate inflated references levels for REDD+ to make this 
mechanism more incentive compared to a strictly his-
torical baseline, these countries could lose credibility and 
be accused of environmental blackmailing. Addressing 
current drivers of deforestation instead of very hypo-
thetical ones is necessary and sufficient, with no need to 
exaggerate baselines, as limiting their impact will be dif-
ficult and costly. The only way to ensure permanence of 
REDD+ credits is by changing the development trends of 
forested countries and eliminating corruption and per-
verse incentives to deforest, which cannot be expressed 
in the form of speculative future deforestation scenarios. 
These scenarios may be useful, but they can only be part 
of a larger bundle of information and arguments that 
should encompass a variety of hypothesis underlying sev-
eral plausible scenarios.
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